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Research.is more than 40 percent higher than the average
construction rate in the 17 years prior to the run-up in
house prices. This construction boom is occurring as
population growth is slowing and the huge baby boom
cohort is reaching ages at which the portion of income
devoted to housing typically declines sharply. It is also
worth noting that virtually no economists projected this
surge in construction prior to its occurence.
* A sharp decline in the savings rate. There is a wealth
effect associated with housing wealth, which leads
people to consume more and save less. The sharp run-
up in house sale prices over the last 8 years has pushed
the savings rate into negative territory, even as most baby
boomers are in their peak savings years. If house prices
continue to outpace inflation, then the savings rate will
decline still further, leaving the vast majority of baby
boomers with little wealth outside of their home.
These three trends strongly suggest that the run-up in
housing prices is inconsistent with the fundamentals of
the housing market, and is more likely attributable to a
speculative bubble. The failure to address a speculative
bubble increases through time. If the Fed chooses to let
a housing bubble expand unchecked, the eventual cost
to the economy and tens of millions of households could
be enormous.
conomic policy-makers and analysts either missed or
chose to ignore the growth of the stock bubble in the
late 1990s. When the stock bubble finally burst, it threw
the economy into a recession. It also destroyed much of
the retirement savings of millions of workers, and it left
many of the country’s largest pension funds badly under-
funded.
Alan Greenspan has consistently defended his decision
not to attempt to address the stock bubble, arguing that
it is not part of the Fed’s mandate. However, he has
been willing to interpret the Fed’s mandate broadly on
other occasions, such as intervening to support the stock
market in 1987. He also interpreted the Fed’s mandate
as requiring him to intervene in the unraveling of the
Long-Term Capital Hedge Fund in 1998.
Benjamin Bernanke, who was nominated by President
Bush to succeed Alan Greenspan, seems determined to
follow the same course. He has argued that there is no
housing bubble, and therefore there is no reason for the
fed to take action to deal with a housing bubble. This
policy raises grave risks, since the impact of a bursting
housing bubble is likely to be even greater than the
impact of the collapse of the stock bubble.
This paper notes three patterns that are difficult to
explain, except as the outcome of an unsustainable run-
up in house sale prices. It notes:
* A sharp divergence between house sale prices
and rents. If house sale prices were pushed up by
fundamentals in the housing market, it would be
expected that rents and house sale prices would rise
together. This divergence is quite visible in many local
markets. When such divergences occurred in the past,
they were usually followed by sharp declines in house
sale prices.
* An extraordinary rate of housing construction.
The pace of housing construction over the last 3 years
Executive Summary
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EThe Federal Reserve Board’s mandate re-
quires it to pursue two goals: full employ-
ment, defined as 4 percent unemployment,
and price stability. It has enormous leeway
in determining what this mandate implies.
For example, in 1998 Alan Greenspan de-
termined that this mandate required the Fed
to intervene in the unraveling of the Long-
Term Capital Hedge Fund. In 1987, he in-
terpreted the mandate as requiring him to
intervene to support the stock market fol-
lowing an unprecedented one day plunge. By
contrast, Greenspan did not believe that the
mandate required him to act to stem a stock
bubble that he first recognized in 1996. In-
stead, he allowed it to expand for four years
before it eventually burst, throwing the
economy into a recession and wiping out
much of the retirement savings of tens of
millions of workers.
As the stock bubble expanded in the late
nineties, housing prices began an unprec-
edented run-up. The stock bubble burst in
March of 2000, with prices falling back to
more normal levels over the next two years.
However, housing prices continued to rise,
propelled by the lowest mortgage rates in fifty
years. This raised the prospect of a housing
bubble rising alongside the stock bubble, as
happened in Japan in the eighties.
Alan Greenspan explicitly denied the exist-
ence of such a bubble, arguing in congres-
sional testimony and other public pronounce-
ments that the run-up in housing prices was
driven by fundamentals. (Factors providing
a fundamental basis for the a run-up in house
prices would include: shortages of land; en-
vironmental restrictions on buildings; higher
incomes and a growing population.) How-
ever, in the last year, Greenspan has taken a
different attitude, warning explicitly of
“frothiness” in some housing markets. By
contrast, Bernard Bernanke, President
Bush’s nominee to succeed Mr. Greenspan,
has explicitly asserted that there is no hous-
ing bubble. This raises the question of
whether it is his intention to ignore the run-
up in housing prices and to simply deal with
the wreckage created by their reversal (if
such a reversal occurs) — Greenspan’s stated
policy towards the stock bubble.
It is worth noting that the wreckage from
such a reversal in housing prices is likely to
be severe. In England, which also had an
extraordinary run-up in housing prices, eco-
nomic growth has slowed by between 1-2 per-
centage points, as house prices stopped ris-
ing. Personal bankruptcies have already
soared to record levels. It remains to be seen
what the effects on the economy and house-
holds’ finances will be if there is a large-scale
reversal in house prices.
This paper examines the evidence for the
existence of a housing bubble. It points out
that it is very difficult to explain this unprec-
edented run-up in housing prices by funda-
mentals of the housing market. It also points
out some implausible implications of this
price run-up being sustained.














rising.In the last eight years, house sale prices have
risen by 55 percent, after adjusting for
inflation.1 There is no precedent for this sort
of run-up in home prices. In the past, home
sale prices have on average just kept pace
with inflation. This run-up in home prices
has had a huge impact on the economy and
people’s personal finances. The housing
sector has been the major engine of growth
following the 2001 recession, as construction
has risen by almost 40 percent since the
recession and a surge in home equity
borrowing sustained strong consumption
growth.
Housing is also a major source of household
wealth. The value of family owned housing
is $18.5 trillion, with more than $6.5 trillion
of this wealth attributable to extraordinary
run-up in house prices of the last eight years.2
For more than half of all households, their
home is by far their largest single asset. While
the run-up in home prices of the last eight
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to feel wealthier than they would be if home
prices had just followed their normal path,
if prices adjust back to more normal levels,
these families will see much of their wealth
disappear.
For these reasons, it is very important to
know whether or not the recent run-up in
house prices is due to fundamental factors,
and therefore likely to be sustained, or
whether it is a bubble that will be reversed
once the bubble psychology driving the run-
up in prices is reversed. On this issue, it is
important to note that the track record of
the economics profession and so-called
financial experts has been abysmal. Very few
economists recognized and warned of the
stock bubble in the late nineties.3 The vast
majority of economists and financial experts
continued to recommend that investors,
including large investors like pension funds,
put their money in the stock market even as
the bubble grew to ever more unsustainable
levels.
It required nothing more than simple
arithmetic to recognize the stock bubble.
Once the price to earnings ratio in the market
got far above its historic average (it peaked
at 33, the historic average was 14.5), it was
impossible to believe that the stock market
could generate anywhere near its historic
rates of return, unless one believed that
economic growth would vastly exceed the
3 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan rec-
ognized the stock bubble, but opted not to warn about
the bubble and the predictable consequences of its col-
lapse.
The Housing Bubble: How We Know It’s Real
1 This discussion relies on the Office of  Federal Hous-
ing Enterprise Oversight’s House Price Index for its
measure of home prices. This index measures the in-
crease in the sale prices of the same homes through
time. In other words, if a home is sold in 2005, it com-
pares the 2005 sale price with the price at which the same
house sold the prior time it was sold. This method
prevents distortions in the index that could result from
a change in a mix of the types of homes being sold.
The period of the run-up in house prices is from the
first quarter of 1997 through the second quarter of 2005,
the most recent quarter for which data are available. The
GDP deflator is used as the measure of inflator
throughout the paper.
2 The value of residential real estate is taken from the
Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts, Balance Sheet
Table B.100 Line 4. The calculation of bubble wealth
takes the difference between the current value, and the
value if house prices had just moved in step with the
GDP deflator since 1997.widely accepted range.4 The fact that so
many “experts” managed to completely miss
something that could have been detected as
easily as the stock bubble should be kept in
mind when assessing views on the housing
market.
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4 This logic is explained in more detail in “Stock Returns
































nate all levels of
government.premium associated with being located in a
specific place.
Environmental restrictions on building have
been in place since at least the 1960s, and
there is no reason to believe that they became
tighter in the late nineties, a period in which
conservatives came to dominate all levels of
government. The fact that homebuilding has
been carried on at a near record pace for the
last three years indicates that these
restrictions have not presented too large an
obstacle on a national basis.
While incomes have grown in the last seven
years, apart from periods of stagnation in the
eighties and early nineties, they have grown
throughout the post-war period. In fact,
income growth was often far more rapid than
what we have experienced in the past eight
years, yet it never led to a comparable run-
up in home prices. The same is true for
population growth. With most baby boomers
preparing for retirement and looking for
smaller homes, demographics would suggest
a relatively slow rate of growth in demand –
certainly much slower than the growth rate
in the seventies and eighties when the huge
baby boom cohort was first forming its own
households.
In short, there is no explanation based in
fundamentals that supports the recent run-
up in home prices. None of the factors
proposed by opponents of the bubble view
are new to the late 1990s. In most cases,
these factors should have been more pressing
as supply constraints or spurs to demand in
prior decades.
If the housing market is not experiencing a
bubble then the run-up in prices since 1997
must be explained by fundamentals. In other
words, there must have been some
fundamental factor that began to affect
supply and/or demand for housing in 1997
(coincidentally at the same time the stock
bubble took off) that had not previously been
present in the market. This issue is dealt
with at somewhat greater length in an earlier
paper,5 but the standard arguments can be
described quickly here.
The factors that have been listed as providing
the fundamental basis for the recent run-up
in house prices are:
1) shortages of land;




It is easy to show that none of these factors
provide a plausible basis for a run-up in
prices in the late nineties.
Taking these factors in turn, there is no
obvious reason why the limited supply of
land should suddenly have started to push
up house prices in 1997, when it never had
previously led to real increases in housing
prices for the country as a whole. (Some
markets have experienced large increases in
housing prices, but these were offset by
declines in housing prices elsewhere.) In fact,
the opportunities for telecommuting offered
by the Internet should have decreased the
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The Non-Bubble Case – What Are the Fundamentals?
5 Baker, D. 2002 “The Run-Up in Home Prices, Is It
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There is one other influence that is often
suggested as a fundamental factor that could
drive up house prices: low interest rates. In
effect, if people only care about the monthly
mortgage payment, then a low interest rate
can push up house prices, just like it pushes
up bond prices. However, rather than
contradicting a bubble view, the low interest
argument actually supports it. If low interest
rates are the main factor explaining high
house prices, then the implication is that
when interest rates rise back to more normal
levels (as virtually all economists expect) then
house prices will plummet back to their trend
growth path.6
In effect, this argument implies that house
prices have entered a new era of
unprecedented volatility. People who buy
homes when interest rates are very low, risk
huge losses if interest rates later rise. On the
other hand, those who buy when interest
rates are very high may experience large gains
if interest rates subsequently decline. House
prices have not historically been that sensitive
to interest rates, but if in fact low interest
rates explain the recent run-up in house
prices, then the country has entered a new
era in which house prices fluctuate hugely
over the course of a business cycle. This
perspective on the housing market is
consistent with the bubble view and implies
that homeownership in the future will be a
far more risky proposition than it has been
in the past.
6 For example, the Congressional Budget Office projects
that the interest rate on the ten-year Treasury bond will
rise to 5.4 percent by 2007. It had been as low as 3.9
percent in the summer.

















growth path.In addition to presenting a sharp departure from prior
history, there are other reasons for believing that the
recent run-up in house prices is a bubble and not driven
by fundamentals. This paper will examine three of these
reasons:
1) There is a sharp divergence between rental prices and
house sale prices – if the run-up is attributable to
fundamental factors of supply and demand in the housing
market, then it should be affecting ownership prices and
rental prices in approximately the same way;
2) The United States is building housing units at a near
record pace, even though its population growth is
slowing sharply and baby boomers are reaching ages at
which they could be expected to consume less housing;
3) If sustained, the run-up in house prices, coupled with
the current building rate, imply that the savings rate will
be driven even further into negative territory, leaving
the country with a massive build-up of debt.
The Evidence for a Housing Bubble
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Each of these sets of facts strongly suggests that
fundamentals cannot explain the run-up in housing
prices. They imply an implausible future, if house prices
remain near their current level.
The Divergence in House Sale Prices and Rents
While house sale prices and rents have occasionally
drifted apart for periods of time, the difference in their
rates of inflation from 1955 to 1995 averaged less than
0.42 percentage points.7 The divergence in these two
series since 1997 is unprecedented. The House Price
Index (HPI) has increased by 51 percentage points more
than the rent index over the last eight years as shown in
Figure 1.
7 The ownership price data use the home purchase component of the
consumer price index (CPI) prior to 1975, an average of the inflation
rate in the home purchase component and the House Price Index
from 1975 until 1982, when the home purchase series was
discontinued, and the Home Price Index for years after 1982. The
rental index is the CPI rent index. The CPI rent index includes some
utilities, which complicates the comparison during periods of rapidly
rising or falling energy prices.
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This divergence is also readily visible in the metropolitan
area housing price data, as all the areas that have
experienced large increases in house prices have also seen
large divergences between house sale prices and rents.
While it is reasonable to expect that rents and house
sale prices would not rise at exactly the same pace if
there were fundamental factors pushing up prices, rents
should continue to rise until they have come close to
catching up with house sale prices. This has not happened
in the areas with rapid house price increase. In most, the
pace of rental inflation has slowed in recent years, and
in some of these markets rents have actually been falling
in real terms in the last year. For example, in the last
year, real rents have fallen by 2.3 percent, 1.7 percent,
and 0.9 percent in San Francisco, Boston, and Seattle,
respectively.8
There have been periods in the past in which local
markets have seen large divergences between house sale
prices and rents. In almost every case these divergences
were followed by a sharp fall in house sale prices. Table
1 shows the 20 largest gaps in inflation rates over any 8-
year period between house sale prices and rents for the
years and metropolitan areas in which data is available.
It also indicates any subsequent decline in real house
sale prices.
8 These figures use the CPI owners equivalent rent series. This series
is better for comparison with sale prices, since it excludes utilities,
however, it is not available prior to 1982.
Table 1




Run-up in Change in Real
Home Prices Home Prices
Over Rents From End of
City and Start of Period (33 Quarters) Period
New York 1978-IV 69% -22%
Boston 1978-II 64 -24
San Diego 1997-I 62
Los Angeles 1997-I 62
Honolulu 1982-IV 59 -32
Miami 1997-I 58
San Francisco 1997-I 57
Boston 1997-I 51
Washington, DC 1997-I 50
Tampa 1997-I 50





San Francisco 1982-I 38 -23
Seattle 1982-III 38 -1
Philadelphia 1997-I 37
Portland 1987-III 35 48
Portland 1997-I 33
Source: OFHEO, BLS, and authors’ calculations.Will a Bursting Bubble Trouble Bernanke? ! 9
As can be seen, of the 20 largest percentage
points gaps between the run-up in house sale
prices and rental prices, 14 have occurred in
the last 8 years. In the 4 of the 6 cases on
this list where there was a large gap in the
years prior to 1997, there was a large
subsequent decline in real house prices. In
the case of Boston home prices fell by 24%.
In the case of New York, prices fell by 22
percent.  On the other hand, prices in
Portland continued to rise.  However, the
initial eight-year run-up in prices in Portland
ends in 1995, just as the nationwide boom
in housing prices begins. Seattle is the only
city on this list where there was a large gap
developing between house sale prices and
rents, prior to the current run-up, where there
was not a subsequent plunge in house sale
prices.
The evidence in Table 1 suggests that large
gaps between the rate of increase in house
sale prices and rents were relatively rare, prior
to the post 1997 run-up. Furthermore, in
most of the cases where such gaps arose in
the past, they were followed by sharp declines
in real house sale prices. This evidence is
consistent with the view that the sharp run-
up in house sale prices in many metropolitan
areas over the last 8 years is likely to be
reversed at some point in the future.
There is one final point worth noting about
the sharp rise in house sale prices in certain
metropolitan areas. It is undoubtedly true
that many people view some of these
metropolitan areas as very desirable places
to live, and therefore are willing to pay a
premium to live in a metropolitan area like
New York or San Francisco compared to
other areas of the country. However, if these
run-ups in house prices reflect fundamentals,
then it should be assumed that rents will
eventually adjust and these areas will then
have a permanently higher cost of living. This
higher cost of living will be reflected not only
in higher rents, but also in higher prices for
all the services in the area, since restaurants,
stores, and other businesses that provide
services will have to pay workers higher
wages in order to compensate for the higher
rents. No one will work for $5.25 an hour in
an area where the cheapest available rent is
$500 or $600 per month. (The rental
components of the CPI account for
approximately 30 percent of the whole index,
which means that as a national average, rent
accounts for approximately 30 percent of
household consumption.).
In effect, housing prices can be viewed as
analogous to a tax. Certainly cities like San
Francisco and New York could impose
special taxes and still have many people who
would be happy to live there, however if the
taxes become high enough, people will opt
to live elsewhere, in spite of the attractions
of these cities. The exact same logic applies
with housing prices. If high housing prices
in a metropolitan area mean that people at
even good-paying jobs will never be able to
save enough to pay for their children’s college
or their own retirement, then it is unlikely
that many people will opt to live there.
Anyone who believes that current house
prices in some of the areas with the sharpest
recent run-ups are driven by fundamentals,
must believe that the families in these areas
can afford homes that in may be three or four
times as expensive as comparable homes
















prices.elsewhere. While families may view these
homes as affordable, if real house prices
continue to rise, this is a description of a
bubble market not one driven by
fundamentals.
Housing Construction Rates
The run-up in real housing prices has led to
near record rates of housing construction.
At the current rate of housing construction,
there will be 2 million units built in 2005, an
amount exceeded only by the 2.4 million
annual rate in 1972.9 Housing construction
will continue at roughly the current pace (or
expand further), unless prices fall to reduce
the profit of building in the current market.
If housing construction continues at this rate,
then it will vastly exceed the average rate of
construction prior to the recent run-up of
prices. It will also exceed the rate of
household formation, leading to a rise in the
ratio of housing units to households.
The average annual rate of housing
construction from 1980 through 1996 was
1.4 million units. The current rate of
construction is a full 43 percent higher than
the rate of construction over this 17-year
period. It is worth noting that virtually no
economists argued that there was serious
pent-up demand nationwide or a housing
shortage due to a lack of construction during
this long period. The sharp increase in
housing construction was almost completely
unexpected. Most of the economists who
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expect this rapid pace of construction to
persist for the indefinite future badly erred
in their projections for the housing market
ten years ago.
The Housing Wealth Effect
There is a large body of economic research
that supports the notion of a housing wealth
effect on consumption of between 4 cents
and 6 cents on the dollar. This means that
for every dollar of additional housing wealth,
consumption will rise between 4 and 6 cents.
If house prices move at approximately the
same pace as the overall inflation rate, as was
the case prior to 1997, then housing will have
little effect on the savings rate. However, if
house prices outpace the overall rate of
inflation, as has been the case since 1997,
then it will lead to a sharply lower savings
rate, a decline that we have actually
witnesses, as the saving rate has turned
negative in recent months.
Furthermore, if housing construction
continues at its current rate – increasing
housing wealth – and real house prices stay
at current levels, it will imply a further
decline in the savings rate. If real house
prices just stay constant, and net housing
construction remains at its average rate over
the last three years (1.4 million units), then
real housing wealth will rise to $23 trillion
by 2015 as shown in Figure 2 below.
This implies a gap in 2015 of $8.3 trillion
between the value of real estate assuming
that housing prices remain constant in real
terms over the next decade, and the value
of residential real estate in 2015 if the house
prices had stayed at their real 1997 level. This
gap implies additional consumption through
9 It is worth noting that housing construction has
historically been subject to very large cyclical fluctuations.
In 1970 there were 1.4 million housing starts. Housing
starts fell back to 1.3 million in 1974 and bottomed
out at less than 1.2 million in 1975.
If high housing












it is unlikely that
many people will
opt to live there.Will a Bursting Bubble Trouble Bernanke?! 11
consistent with the claims of economists who deny that
there is a housing bubble, in part because they view it as
normal for house prices to increase at the same rate as
income. In this scenario, real housing wealth will reach
$29 trillion in 2015. The implied wealth effect would
lead to a household savings rate of between –3.2 and –
4.3 percent by 2015. While households in aggregate
would have accumulated substantial housing wealth, they
would be rapidly losing any other form of wealth. It is
unlikely that any economist would want to argue that
this is a plausible scenario. (These savings scenarios
would look markedly worse if it is assumed that the
government raises taxes at some point in the next decade
to deal with its budget deficit.)
the wealth effect of between 280 and 500 billion a year.
This is equal to between 3 and 5 percent of projected
disposable income.  This trend in house prices would
leave the savings rate at approximately its current level
of -1.1 percent of disposable income.
This scenario describes an economy in which households
are on average losing wealth (other than their homes) –
getting poorer year by year. While this can happen for a
period of time, no economist will argue that households
can on average sustain a negative savings rate. Of course,
this negative savings rate would be partially offset, if it
were assumed that house prices continued to outpace
the overall rate of inflation. This would allow household
wealth to continue to grow, but housing wealth would
increasingly displace non-housing wealth.
The top line in Figure 2 shows the trend in housing
wealth, if real house prices continue to rise at the same
pace over the next decade as real personal disposable
income per-capita.10  This pattern in house prices is
10 This projection assumes that disposable income grows at the same
rate as real GDP per-capita as projected by CBO.  This growth rate is
much slower than the rate at which house prices have risen since 1997.

















































Real HPI Rises with Real Personal Income
Real HPI Freezes in 2005
Real HPI Freezes in 1995
Source: OFHEO and authors’ calculations.This paper has briefly examined three trends
that strongly support the view that the recent
run-up in house prices is driven by a
speculative bubble, rather than
fundamentals. First, it notes the unusual gap
between the run-up in home sale prices and
rents at both the national level and in many
of the most inflated metropolitan markets.
Such gaps are unusual, since the same forces
that drive up home sale prices should also
drive up rents, if they are being driven by
fundamentals. When such gaps have
developed in the past, they usually have been
followed by sharp declines in house sale
prices.
The second factor suggesting that the current
run-up reflects a bubble is the extraordinary
pace of home construction in recent years.
The current pace is roughly 43 percent higher
than the average pace of construction over
the period from 1980 to 1997. This pace of
construction substantially exceeds that rate
of new household formation. It is also worth
noting that virtually no economists projected
a sharp price in home construction in the
mid-nineties, so most of the economists who
expect the current pace of housing
construction to persist, badly erred in their
projections for housing construction in the
past.
Finally, the wealth effect resulting from the
recent run-up in house prices has led to a
sharp decline in the savings rate. In recent
months, the savings rate has turned negative.
If construction continues at its recent pace
and real house prices stay at current levels,
then the savings rate will become even more
sharply negative over the next decade. If real
house prices continue to rise at the same rate
as they have over the last decade, then the
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household savings rate could reach –4.3
percent in 2015.
It is not plausible that an economy will
sustain a negative savings rate for any
substantial period of time. This would imply
that households’ non-housing wealth is
continually declining. The more likely
scenario is that housing prices will fall back
in line with their historic values.
The bulk of economists failed to recognize
the stock bubble. As a result of this failure,
tens of millions of workers lost much of
their retirement savings in the crash. Many
of the country’s largest pension funds are
now badly under-funded because their
managers failed to recognize that the market
was over-valued. In addition, the
Congressional Budget Office overstated
capital gains tax revenue by more than $600
billion because it expected the stock bubble
to persist indefinitely.
The costs of a collapse of the housing bubble
will be even greater than the costs of the
collapse of the stock bubble, because
housing wealth is much more evenly held.
The failure of the economics profession to
adequately warn of the stock bubble was an
act of extraordinary negligence. Missing the
housing bubble is an even bigger mistake.
Conclusion
In this scenario,
real housing
wealth will
reach $29
trillion in 2015.
Most of the
economists who
expect this rapid
pace of con-
struction to
persist for the
indefinite future
badly erred in
their projections
for the housing
market ten
years ago.